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2Abstract 
High-growth firms appear to be key drivers of new industries and technologies.  Here we 
investigate the contribution of these and other types of firm to a technology cluster, in the 
context of ‘creative destruction’ shaping the evolution of the cluster. Evidence on the 
reallocation of scarce resources through processes of creative destruction is scarce. But in a 
cluster the effects of creative destruction can be traced through such developments as (1) firm 
exits and entries (2) change in firm size distribution and (3) acquisition of firms. We apply churn 
analysis, firm size transition analysis and analysis of acquisition to the technology cluster in 
Cambridge UK over twenty years. Firm growth contributed two-thirds of all new job creation, 
while entry-exit turbulence accounted for one third of job creation. High-growth firms accounted 
for a quarter of jobs created in the Cambridge cluster during this period, without ever making up 
more than 3% of all tech firms. There has been an increase in average firm size and profitability. 
A fall in entry rates and fewer firms moving up into larger size categories in recent years point to 



















Research on high-growth firms has yielded important insights, but questions remain. In this 
study, we address questions on the contribution of specific groups of firms to a spatial 
collectivity or cluster of firms, with particular reference to high growth firms. Our evidence is 
drawn from a pioneering European high-technology cluster, Cambridge, UK. Schumpeter argued 
that creative destruction is an enabler of innovation, re-allocating productive resources to more 
efficient use. Here we examine how the emergence and expansion of the Cambridge technology 
cluster was shaped by creative destruction as evidenced by turbulence in firm entries, exits, by 
firm size transitions and by bursts of acquisition. We examine both rates of growth and modes of 
growth. These methods could be used elsewhere to yield comparative evidence; here we attempt 
only a brief comparison with Silicon Valley before and after the technology crash, yielding 
evidence on the resilience of the Cambridge cluster on the eve of the financial crisis.  
 
We give particular attention to the contribution to the cluster of high growth firms - these 
“gazelles”, have been viewed as vehicles for future economic growth in advanced economies. 
The European Union’s Lisbon Strategy emphasised the development of clusters and support for 
rapidly growing firms, while the United Kingdom’s industrial policy has viewed growth firms as 
being at the heart of new industries and new jobs. Economic downturn raises questions as to 
ability of such growth firms to persist and flourish. The dynamics of high growth firms and 
trends shaping the clusters to which they contribute require longitudinal evidence, which is 
scarce internationally but available on Cambridge for 1988-2008.  
  
Our evidence shows that the Cambridge tech cluster grew because it generated new firms, 
because its constituent firms grew and because the cluster attracted firms from elsewhere. 
Between 1988 and 2008, employment in the Cambridge tech cluster grew from under 27,000 to 
over 43,000 jobs, with the IT sector providing about half of all firms but important sectors also 
in biopharm, telecoms and instrumentation among others. Numbers of tech based firms increased 
from around 800 in 1988 to around 1300 in 2008 (depending on definitions used) as a series of 
entry waves occurred. Growth of indigenous firms contributed two-thirds of all new job creation 
1988-2008, while entry-exit accounted for one third of job creation. High growth firms 
accounted for more than 16% of total employment and almost a quarter of net new job creation 
during growth years although they never made up more than 3% of all tech based firms. High 
growth firms contributed disproportionately to cluster employment during periods of upswing 
but were also important in maintaining growth during periods when the cluster at large 
contracted. Since 2004, tech firms having fewer than 10 employees have accounted for a smaller 
proportion of the total, following the formation and collapse of a micro-firm bubble, particularly 
in IT. This trend reflects the technology crash of 2000-2001 in the US, where many customer 
firms are located. In Cambridgeshire there was a fall in numbers of IT start ups and IT firms with 
fewer than 5 employees after 2002. Over the period as a whole, the proportion of small firms 
declined in relation to midsized and larger firms, but small firms remained the most numerous 
category, a feature of firm size distribution which is also found nationally and internationally. 
Patenting activity declined by more than half following the technology crash; the recent retreat 
of venture capital may have decreased incentives for patenting. 
 
Larger firms showed less volatile growth than smaller ones. Four of the most successful firms, 
for example, ARM, Autonomy, Domino and CSR, have grown throughout the period, setting up 
4international operations. The creative destruction thesis would interpret the sustained growth of a 
minority of firms as evidence that resources and talents were redirected from some less 
successful firms to those performing well enough to expand. While this interpretation is in 
question without more detailed evidence on resource mobility, undoubtedly the ability of firms 
to overcome growth setbacks and sustain their growth after an interruption was critical for the 
cluster. The increasing number of larger firms, in particular the growth of the ‘big four’, reduced 
the vulnerability of jobs in the cluster to the downturn. 
 
Acquisition is another dimension of turbulence affecting entry and exit. In the Cambridge 
cluster, acquisition activity intensified from the mid-1990s onwards, with foreign firms 
constituting almost half the acquirers. While evidence on the impact of acquisitions is very 
limited because of reporting discontinuities, corporate acquirers generally attempt to introduce 
more professional management systems and operations. This should enable the acquired unit to 
grow more profitable with fewer inputs of employees and other assets. Our evidence is consistent 
with such developments. However there may also be an element of destruction in the turbulence 
of acquisition. High performing firms were particularly likely to be acquired (the probability was 
three times higher than for other firms), and in many cases our data show that acquisition was 
followed by job losses, asset reduction and repatriation of profits by foreign owners. However 
firms performing well were also ten times more likely to grow through acquisition than those 
with less rapid pre-acquisition growth. In contrast with independent US companies such as 
Microsoft, Oracle and Google, where founder managers continued to drive strategy, innovation 
in high performing Cambridge firms may have been affected by strategy being driven from 
corporate HQs.  Post acquisition spinoff effects require further investigation. A positive effect of 
such spinoffs is the new entry effect, as those selling their firms to acquirers start out new firms, 
so increasing the pool of firms eligible for growth into larger categories. Historical evidence 
shows that it takes many such start ups to generate a firm able to sustain high performance.  
 
The data presented in this study are from the eve of the financial crisis, for benchmarking with 
further survey details when these become available. We have built on a subset of the county 
employers’ database (1988-2008) of the employment records of all technology firms in the 
Cambridge area. We have added fields on acquisitions, spin-offs and patents and performance 
data mainly from Companies House. We selected 2329 firms in six sectors for investigation. For 
most years, we had data on firms providing over 70% of employment by technology-based firms 
in the area. While interpretation of these figures cannot be generalised to the population of firms 
as a whole, it reveals trends for the firms concerned, which make up about two thirds of current 
tech based firms in the area. 
 
Schumpeter recognised that small firms were highly vulnerable, and only a few of them grow in 
such a way as to displace established rivals. But a simple form of the creative destruction thesis 
(small firms grow to displace incumbents) cannot convey responses to business cycles in 
clusters. Average tech firm size in Cambridgeshire has increased since the downturn. In the short 
term and during a downturn, fewer microfirms imply fewer firms vulnerable to recession. Just as 
in the plant world, new shoots are ‘switched off” under adverse environmental conditions, so a 
reduction in the proportion of very small and vulnerable firms in the cluster may reflect an 
adaptation to a difficult economic environment. The larger firms providing more local jobs in 
uncertain times may reduce the incentive to potential entrepreneurs to start new firms. In the 
longer term, there may be compensating effects at work if those fewer firms that are started 
5during a recession prove to be unusually robust. We have shown elsewhere that there were very 
high survival rates among the cohort firms founded in the recession of the early 1990s; low entry 
rates can be compensated for when economic conditions improve. However a prolonged 
recession may prevent such recovery.  
 
Firm entry figures show that as less favourable conditions followed the technology boom period, 
there was a reduction in start up rates. We have also identified a lagged effect whereby a 
reduction in the pool of smaller firms was followed in the next survey period by a reduction in 
the number of midsized companies. For the most successful Cambridge tech firms, the period 
when they were mid-sized was formative. A reduction in the mid sized category implies a 
reduction in the pool eligible to move into larger size categories. Thus without policy input to 
loosen constraints on young knowledge based firms, business cycles effects on the cluster may 
persist over time. If these firms are to sustain their contribution to innovation and exports in a 
knowledge-based economy, considerable effort should be devoted to pilot policies to provide 
conditions favourable for their growth. 
61. Introduction 
Research on high-growth firms has been burgeoning and has yielded important insights into their 
nature and impact (Storey, 1994; Acs et al., 2008; Henrekson and Johansson, 2009). But 
unanswered questions persist. Here we address questions on the contribution of specific groups 
of firms to a spatial collectivity or cluster of firms, in the context of a pioneering European high-
technology cluster, Cambridge, UK. We attempt a dynamic analysis, tracing the way in which 
the emergence and expansion of the Cambridge technology cluster was shaped by firm entries, 
exits, by firm size transitions and by acquisition trends; we examine both rate of growth and 
mode of growth (McKelvie and Wiklund, 2010).  These methods could be used elsewhere to 
yield comparative evidence.  
Academics and policy makers increasingly regard high-growth firms, often termed “gazelles”, as 
vehicles for future economic growth in advanced economies. The European Union’s Lisbon 
Strategy emphasised the development of clusters and support for rapidly growing firms – a 
position echoed by the United Kingdom’s emerging industrial policy, which sees growth firms at 
the heart of new industries and new jobs (EU, 2004; BERR, 2009; BIS, 2010). If clusters of fast 
growth firms are so important, it is critical to understand their dynamics and that of the clusters 
to which they contribute.  
We proceeded as follows. In section 2, building on a review of prior research, we develop 
propositions to guide our analysis. We explain our logic of inquiry and sources of evidence in 
section 3. Section 4 presents evidence from a variety of sources on the role of high-growth firms 
in the emergence of the Cambridge cluster. Finally, section 5 interprets this evidence in the light 
of our propositions and links the findings to prior research.   
2. Theoretical Development 
2.1. Prior Work 
The development and growth of tech clusters reflect complementary effects: local firm 
formation, local firm growth and firm growth through acquisition or merger (Garnsey and 
Heffernan 2005). Over time, local effects attract entry of firms from elsewhere.  Building on 
prior work we address the question: what is the contribution to the development of a technology-
based cluster of growth by various types of constituent firms? We investigate this question in 
terms of a set of related propositions below. Our methodologies are designed to tap into 
processes of change over time, not to identify significance levels for cross-sectional findings of 
variance (Van de Venn, 2002). 
While Gibrat provides an early example of firm growth studies, the origins of research on high-
growth firms are commonly attributed to Birch (Gibrat, 1931; Birch 1979). Birch stressed the 
contribution of small firms to national employment in the United States, particularly that of 
rapidly growing firms termed “gazelles” (Birch 1979, 1981). Recent work has proceeded at three 
levels. The economic contribution of high-growth firms has been studied at a national level in a 
variety of contexts and economic systems. Jovanovic showed that in 1999 four U.S. high-growth 
firms had achieved valuations equal to 13% of the U.S. GDP (2001). At the meso-level, scholars 
have concentrated on high-growth firms within particular industries. Storey provides one 
instance of such work (1994). Recent work at this level has stressed the importance of high-
growth firms’ environment on their innovative capabilities (Sarkar et al., 2006; Acs and Mueller, 
2008). This stream of work has begun to analyse the spatial distribution and impact of high-
growth firms, analysing questions such as the role of high-growth firms in regional restructuring 
(Frederick, 2004; Stam, 2005, 2009; Julien, 2007). Research has highlighted the need for further 
analysis of this issue (Acs and Mueller, 2008). At the micro-level, researchers have sought to 
7develop concepts and identify distinguishing characteristics of high-growth firms for improved 
empirical testing and theorising. Moreno and Casillas develop a conceptual framework of high-
growth firm processes (2005). Recently, this stream of work has developed an interest in the 
dynamics of high-growth firms, focusing on questions such as the strategic rationale underlying 
different growth patterns (e.g. St-Jean, Julien and Audet, 2008; Parker, van Witteloostuijn and 
Storey, forthcoming 2010). St-Jean et al. provide exploratory evidence on these issues (2008). 
All three approaches share the use of average growth rates as key analytic measures, while 
micro-level studies make use of case evidence. Storey provided an extensive review of early 
research (Storey, 1994), while Henrekson and Johansson offer a comprehensive survey of recent 
contributions (Henrekson and Johansson, 2009). They mention new entry and exit, organic 
growth and growth by acquisition as relevant themes. We explore all three, taking the technology 
cluster in Cambridge UK as an exemplar of a locality with a high concentration of innovative 
firms, presumably subject to forces of creative destruction.     
In many prior studies cross-sectional methods predominate (Storey, 1994; Henrekson and 
Johansson, 2009). These approaches have provided insight but do not represent firm growth as a 
process unfolding over time (Garnsey 1998). Although some studies on high-growth firms 
provide evidence on firm age and survival, discussions of the processes underlying these 
indicators are limited. Accordingly, methodological approaches are needed that improve our 
understanding of growth processes over time. Elsewhere we look into the sustainability of 
growth by young firms (Garnsey and Mohr, forthcoming 2010). Our objective in this paper is the 
more limited one of using available data to trace the contribution over time of specific categories 
of firms, notably fast growth firms, to the Cambridge technology cluster.   
2.2. The Investigation 
While the impact of high-growth firms has been investigated at the national and industry level, 
there has been less research at the local level based on longitudinal evidence. Concentrations of 
high-growth firms, prominent in certain places can play a critical role in the development of 
local economies (Frederick, 2004; Julian, 2007). We investigate the proposition that: 
P1: High growth firms contribute disproportionately to employment growth in a cluster.   
 To assess the contribution of high-growth firms to cluster development, we explore three themes 
in particular: (1) entry/exit (churn rates), (2) growth of existing firms and (3) acquisition. Churn 
rates (also termed turbulence) provide evidence on Schumpeter’s thesis that innovative new 
firms arise and replace old ones. Turbulence as a form of creative destruction was highlighted by 
Henrekson and Johansson: 
“a prerequisite for the growth of these [fast growth] firms is also that the process of 
creative destruction functions so that efficient new and expanding firms can attract 
resources from inefficient firms, resources that are released through contraction and exits. 
Without this dynamic reallocation the growth of firms will be hampered […]” (2009 p. 
17).  
It is a challenge to inform the creative destruction concept with relevant evidence; how can it be 
shown that attracted resources were released through contraction and exits of inefficient firms, 
rather than being derived from other sources, e.g. entry into an industry of firms also active in 
other sectors? But while entry and exit is not a zero-sum process, we can assume that in a small 
area there are constraints on the supply of skilled local labour for innovative firms and 
competition to attract investors. Thus the inference can be drawn that the entry and expansion of 
certain categories of new firms will, at least in part, be at the expense of the elimination of 
certain other local categories. The effects should show up in changes in creation of new firms 
8(net entries). Growth of incumbent innovative firms would exhibit the creative rather than 
destructive aspects of the process. Tech firms in Cambridge are mainly innovative and provide 
us with evidence for investigating our second proposition: 
P2: The employment contribution to the cluster of net firm entry-exit is greater than the 
contribution to the cluster of growth by existing firms  
Detailed entry/exit and size category evidence is needed to support this inference about churn 
rates (relevant to Schumpeter’s thesis on creative destruction) and to illuminate the broader 
question of the role of net new entries in the development of a cluster, relative to continuing 
growth of existing firms.  
A second source of growth is the process of organic growth in firms located in a cluster (Arthur, 
1989). Processes of this kind are difficult to quantify at the collective level of the cluster (Van de 
Ven, 2002). However, an indicator of growth processes as revealed by collective evidence is 
provided by numbers of firms moving from one size category to another (Birch, 1979; Biga, 
2008). New firms predominate in smaller size categories. Because of the immature resource base 
of new firms and limited reserves of small firms, these categories are particularly likely to 
exhibit growth volatility (Garnsey, 1998). Accordingly, we investigate the proposition:  
P3: Small firms exhibit greater growth volatility than large firms during the expansion of 
a cluster 
The third growth source highlighted by Henrekson and Johansson in the context of high-growth 
firms is that of growth achieved through acquisition of the resource base of other firms (2009; 
Pasanen, 2007). Accordingly, we propose: 
 P4: High-growth firms were more active acquirers than other firms.  
At the same time, however, growing and rapidly growing firms may attract corporate acquirers 
who eliminate the venture as an independent entity. Acquiring firms may seek to own the 
resource-base supporting the performance of high-growth firms, in an effort to overcome the 
problems of inertia and reduced innovativeness associated with large size (Dougherty and Heller, 
1994; Ranft and Lord, 2002). High-growth tech firms may be particularly attractive targets for 
incumbents. There is a choice to be made between acquisition and independent growth for young 
firms that have achieved strong performance (e.g. Graebner and Eisenhardt, 2004; Casson, 
2009). Owners of high growth firms may prefer to see the firm acquired, assuring returns to 
owners, rather than undergo the further risks of independent growth. Moreover acquirers are 
more likely to seek targets with a track record of strong growth. Accordingly, we propose: 
 P5: High-growth firms were more frequently acquired than other firms. 
At the regional level, as at the firm level, the impact of acquisitions on cluster development 
remains in question, though there have been an increasing incidence of “technology 
acquisitions” of this kind since the 1990s (Chaudhuri and Tabrizi, 1999; Gerpott, 2009). Work 
by Mason suggests that acquisition may support local economic activity by inducing business 
angels (private investors) to support start-ups (2004). On the other hand, acquisitions may impair 
a cluster’s development when, following an acquisition,  innovative entrepreneurs are replaced 
by corporate managers and when technologies and employment are transferred to less innovative 
owner companies, head quartered elsewhere. We begin with evidence on employment growth 
following takeover, investigating the proposition: 
P6: Acquisitions resulted in job-losses in acquired firms. 
9Later we look at other ways of measuring turbulence following acquisition. 
These six propositions together depict links between high-firm growth and cluster development. 
Relationships between constructs outlined above are summarised in figure 1.   
  
Figure 1 – Summary of Investigation 
2.3. The Context 
To operationalise relevant research questions we have asked them of a well-known cluster of 
technology-based firms – those in and around Cambridge, U.K. The Cambridge cluster emerged 
in the 1970s, unexpected and unplanned, in a famous university and market town (current 
population 150,000). The entrepreneurial processes unfolding in the Cambridge area were 
largely free of the effects of large government or corporate investment characteristic of other 
clusters. Around Cambridge University, productive opportunities emerged for entrepreneurs to 
meet growing international demand for specialist knowledge. Spin-off ventures originating from 
the university set off further cycles of attraction for businesses to move into the area (Garnsey 
and Heffernan, 2005; Drofiak and Garnsey 2009). We sought to uncover the dynamics of growth 
among different categories of firms which together resulted in the collective trends of cluster 
development and provide some indication of trends to come.    
3. Methodology 
3.1. Data Source 
Our data are mainly from the IfM database on technology firms in the Cambridge area. This is 
the outcome of first author collaboration with Cambridgeshire County Research Unit (CCRU) 
over twenty years. We have built on a subset of their company commercial dataset (1988-2008) 
of the employment records of all technology firms in the Cambridge area (Garnsey and 
Heffernan 2005). We selected 2329 firms in six sectors for investigation. For most years, we had 
data on firms providing over 70% of employment by technology-based firms in the area. As the 
county database was limited to employment, we created a further dataset from public domain 
sources (the Mohr-Garnsey technology firm data set) with fields on acquisitions, spin-offs and 
patents and performance data. The wider performance data in the Mohr-Garnsey data set covered 
firms distributed (in terms of size and sector) somewhat differently from those of the overall 
population of technology-based firms in Cambridgeshire (CCRU/IfM). Thus interpretation of 
these figures cannot be generalised to the population of firms as a whole but reveals trends for 
the firms concerned, which make up about two thirds of current tech based firms in the area.  
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Figure 2 – Firm Size Distribution Comparison by Data Source 
3.2. Analytic Approach 
Our aim is to uncover processes of change over time (Van de Ven et al 2002). Accordingly we 
do not use cross sectional analysis, although cross sectional regression analysis is the standard 
methodology in many studies of firm growth. We used entry-exit analysis (churn analysis) over 
this period of time to operationalise ideas conveyed by the Schumpeterian term ‘creative 
destruction’, the idea that innovative new firms replace those that are eliminated by the forces of 
change. Churn analysis is used to examine the effects of new firms and exits of technology firms 
from the area, either through closure or departure. A second tool we use to capture change over 
time is firm size transition analysis. By this method we identified the net number of firms 
moving between each size category over each two year period, a negative value indicating a net 
flow of firms downsizing – thus moving to a smaller size category. Thirdly we examined entry of 
firms into the cluster through acquisition and the contribution of takeovers to growth of the 
cluster. 
4. Evidence from the Cambridge Cluster 
4.1. Firm Growth in the Cambridge Cluster: The Overall Scene  
As we have seen, the Cambridge high tech phenomenon emerged in the 1970s (Segal, Quince 
and Partners, 1985). The number of technology-based jobs increased throughout the 1980s and 
1990s, after a brief downturn in the early 1990s (figure 3). Firm numbers fell following the 
technology crash of the new millennium, but total jobs recovered during the boom period of 
2006-8, despite a difficult period for technology firms worldwide. 
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Figure 3 – Number of Firms and Employment in the Cambridge Cluster 
The development of the cluster was shaped by waves of entry of firms into various sectors. 
Figure 4 summarises these waves, indicating the time periods when half of all firms ever active 
in the area entered the cluster. By this measure, early entry waves of electronics and 
manufacturing, were followed by further entries into instrumentation, IT, biotechnology, 
telecommunication and R&D.   
 
Figure 4 – Number of Firms and Employment in the Cambridge Cluster 
Firm numbers were in part driven by spin-off activity from the University of Cambridge. Figure 
4 illustrated the number of official spin-outs and unofficial start-ups from Cambridge University. 
While unofficial start-ups by members of the university (staff and graduates) outnumbered 
official start-ups in which the university held a stake, both types of firms provided a continuous 
supply of innovative technology-based firms to the cluster.  Figure 5 includes the further spin-
offs from previous university spin-offs that we were able to identify, providing evidence of the 
impact of serial enterprise. 
 
Figure 5 – Spin-Outs and Start-Ups from Cambridge University 
Over time, high-growth firms made notable contributions to the employment and financial 
performance of the Cambridge cluster. Figure 6 indicates the share of high-growth firms in the 
employment and firm population of the Cambridge cluster. High-growth firms constituted a 
small number of firms until the mid 1990s, after when their share almost tripled. Following a 
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short downturn in the wake of the crisis of the early 2000s, high-growth firms have maintained 
their share in the total. Throughout the same period, high-growth firms became increasingly 
important employers. After a period of rapid expansion from the late 1980s until the late 1990s, 
high-growth firms continued to expand their prominence in the local labour market, albeit at a 
reduced rate.  
 
Figure 6 – Share of High-Growth Firms of Cluster Employment and Firm Numbers 
High-growth firms consistently provided a percentage of employment that was greater than their 
share in numbers of firms, supporting Proposition 1. Figure 7 compares the overall employment 
changes in high-growth firms and in all firms in the tech cluster.  During the early 1990s and 
2000s, high-growth firms were creating employment at a time when there were job losses 
associated with downturns in the economy and were growing faster than average during years of 
economic upswing. Across the observation period, high-growth firms (there were 39 such firms 
by 2008), accounted for 24% of jobs created during this period, though these firms, growing at 
20% or more pa., never made up more than 3% of the total of firms. 
 
Figure 7 – Employment Development High-Growth Firms versus Cluster 
4.2. Dynamic Elements in the Expansion of the Cluster 
4.2.1. Turbulence measured by churn (entry/exit rates) 
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The overall figures on firm and employment numbers reflect the net effect of entries and exits. 
There is evidence to suggest that the larger firms in the area experienced growth reinforcement 
effects (Garnsey, 1998) while smaller firms, especially in sectors where barriers to entry were 
low, were more likely to be eliminated as the business cycle turned against them. Most recently, 
the uncertain economic climate appears to have deterred start ups, as shown in the figures for 
university spinoffs (figure 5) and by the following entry-exit analysis. The database has records 
for 104 new firms created between 2006 and 2008, shown in figure 8. This is only 37% of the 
peak total of 279 in 2002. But the number of lost firms was lower between 2006 and 2008 and 
new entries rose. These changes in numbers of firms and jobs are reflected in the falling and then 
rising mean size of employment per firm (Evans and Garnsey 2009).  
 
Figure 8 – Entry and Exit of Technology Firms in Cambridgeshire 
Figure 9 shows the employment impact of turbulence in relation to that of firm growth. The net 
employment effects of entry and exit were sustained expansion during the 1990s, reaching a high 
point during the 2000s. However growth-related employment changes outweighed the effects of 
firm entry and exit.  Thus proposition 2 is not supported. Over the observation period, firm 
growth amounted to two-thirds of all new job creation, while entry-exit related turbulence (net 
firm changes) accounted for one third of job creation. Accordingly, we turn next to growth of 
existing firms.     
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Figure 9 – Employment Effects of Firm Entries and Exits  
4.2.2. Expansion of the Cluster through Organic Growth of Existing Firms 
Expansion and elimination of firms are clearly evident in employment distribution. The analysis 
in figure 10 shows the employment distribution by the employment size of firms biennially from 
2000 to 2008. This analysis shows that since 2004 there has been a fall in the proportion of 
employment in firms smaller than 10 people, congruent with the formation and collapse of a 
micro-firm bubble. This reflects the technology crash of 2000-2001 in the US, where many 
customer firms are located, especially in IT; there was a fall in numbers of IT start ups and IT 
firms with fewer than 5 employees after 2002.  Over the period as a whole, the proportion of 
small firms declined in relation to midsized and larger firms, but small firms remained the most 
numerous category, a feature of firm size distribution nationally and internationally. 
 
Figure 10 - Employment Distribution by Employment Size Categories 
Figure 11 shows the impact of the micro-firm sector on aggregate employment, with the most 
recent proportion of employment in micro-firms at its lowest level at any stage in the past 20 
years, following a boom and then decline in numbers of IT micro-firms. This sector has low 
entry barriers. This shakeout in the aftermath of the technology bubble of the early 2000s 
represented a return to trend in the development of the IT sector, following the tech boom 
(Garnsey and Drofiak, 2009). R&D and biotech sectors have grown and tend to be larger in size 
than the IT software or services companies.   
 
Figure 11 - Microfirm Impact upon the Cluster 
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What are the implications of the decline in start-up rates shown by churn analysis and the 
reduction in number of small vulnerable firms?  So long as enough small firms are viable and 
growing, the size of the pool of smaller firms may not be salient.  However it is necessary to 
carry out firm size transition analysis to trace the effects of changes in relative size distribution 
on the dynamics of the cluster. 
We can isolate the processes by which firm size distribution has changed over the period by a 
form of transition analysis which shows the collective effect of firms passing through size 
categories as they grow or decline ( figures 12a and 12b). Here we see the greater volatility of 
small firms compared to larger ones as regards size change, providing support for proposition 3. 
 
Figure 12a – Cambridge Technology Firm Size - Transition Analysis 
Figure 12a uses the conventional size categories where the greater volatility of the smaller firms 
is partly an artifact of the classification system, since to register a change in size category 
requires a much greater absolute change in job numbers for the bigger firms. The smaller firms 
move more rapidly between size categories. Therefore we reclassified firms into even size 
categories (Figure 12b).  
 
Figure 12b – Cambridge Technology Firm Size – Adjusted Transition Analysis 
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From figure 12b we see that the sensitivity of smaller Cambridge based hi-tech firms to business 
cycles is a real effect, not just the result of size categories. Mid-sized firms (50-149 and 100-199) 
also changed size categories to a greater extent than the larger firms. Since mid-sized categories 
were not replenished by new firm entries (which are mainly of small firms), they depend on 
replenishment by firms outgrowing smaller size categories. There were occasions when there 
was a net fall in numbers in midsized categories, especially between 2002 and 2006.  This 
appeared to be a lagged effect, whereby fewer firms in the smallest category – eligible for 
growth into the next size category – was followed in the next survey period by a reduction in the 
number of firms moving up to next size category – that is, the midsized category was not being 
replenished by smaller firms growing to midsized. This points to the longer term implications for 
cluster growth of fewer small firms growing in size since mid-sized firms are more stable than 
smaller firms. For the cluster as a whole, however, employee growth in a few larger firms was 
able to offset job reductions in a much higher number of smaller firms, restoring the employment 
growth of the entire cluster by 2008 shown in figure 1. 
The above calculations make it possible to identify the size categories that gave rise to high-
growth firms (those with average growth rates of over 20% per year.)   Of the 39 high growth 
firms in the Cambridge tech cluster, 17 began in the micro-firm category (fewer than 10 
employees), 18 started with between 10-50 employees, and 4 firms began with more than 50 
employees. It is firms with a larger than average start-up team (largest cases reflecting demerger 
effects or buyouts) that are most likely to realise rapid growth. This was also a finding by 
Reynolds and White in their extensive US study (1997).  
Launch on the stock market (initial public offering, IPO) provided an exit route for investors in 
performing ventures, and a source of resources for independent growth. Among the 39 high-
growth firms identified, over a quarter (11),  achieved an IPO from among  75 IPOs that we 
identified in all Cambridge tech firms listing on a stock market over the period 1988 to 2008. 
Four local start ups achieved outstanding performance, reaching over 1000 employees and 
become leading firms in their industries.  They are Domino (ink jet printing), ARM (chip 
design), Autonomy (search engines) and Cambridge Silicon Radio (semiconductor).  These firms 
shown together in figure 13 grew rapidly from 2003 to 2008, after a period of stability following 
the technology crash, reaching a combined turnover of £1.4b and providing over 6000 jobs in the 
area by 2008, almost 15% of all jobs.   They demonstrate the importance of rapid growth which 
sets off growth reinforcement effects.  However individually, each firm went through periods of 
setback (as shown elsewhere, e.g. Garnsey, Ferriani et al 2006). Firms’ ability to overcome 
setbacks is no less important than rapid growth, but has received less attention in the literature. 
 
Figure 13 – Cumulative Impact of ARM, Autonomy, CSR and Domino 
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 4.2.3. Growth Through Acquisition  
Innovative Cambridge firms attracted both national and international acquirers. While 
acquisition by other firms was initially a rare occurrence among Cambridge technology firms, by 
the late 1990s, the incidence of acquisition was nearly double the rates of the 1980s (see figure 
14). This increase could be observed for both acquisitions of Cambridge firms by other firms and 
for acquisitions made by Cambridge firms. About half of acquirers (46%) were foreign, 34% 
from the US. The markets for acquisition reflected business cycles. Thus, acquisition increased 
almost seven-fold during the technology boom of the late 1990s before declining during the early 
2000s. Overriding business cycles, acquisition has attained growing prominence in the 
Cambridge technology cluster. Acquisition was important for founders and investors in realising 
the value of their enterprises. We were able to identify acquisition terms for 72 cases; for 
valuations that were disclosed the total exceeded £6 billion. It was not possible to identify 
beneficiaries of the deals or how returns were distributed. 
 
Figure 14 – Number of Acquisitions across six sectors per Year 
High-growth firms were frequent acquisition targets. Overall, some 42%, of all high-growth 
firms were acquired. This compares with an incidence of 14% among all firms. Only 5% of all 
firms resorted to acquisitions as a means of growth (cf. Pasanen, 2007); this share was higher for 
high-growth firms, among which 50% of firms had acquired another firm. These patterns lend 
support propositions 4 and 5 which stated that high growth firms are more likely to be acquirers 
and to be acquired than other firms. 
It is seldom possible to follow the same firm’s growth from independence through to its status as 
a unit in the acquiring company. Performance data for the acquired unit is usually conflated with 
that of the acquiring firm. However we were able to gather public domain data on pre- and post-
acquisition performance for Cambridge technology companies from the six sectors that 
accounted for most acquisitions. Improvements in profitability were frequently associated with 
restructuring that led to reduction in assets and employees, thus supporting proposition 6 
(acquisitions were associated with job losses in the acquired units). Table 1 compares other 
performance indicators before and after acquisition. Over a three year period before and after 
takeover (right side of table 1), there was a small decrease in employment but a sizeable 
improvement in profitability and cash position for firms reporting data. The cumulative data (left 
side of table 1) shows a contrast between 38% growth in jobs before acquisition and 11% decline 
in jobs, afterwards. Growth in assets did not continue over the long term (left). 
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Dimension Cumulative change before/after acquisition, all available data  3 Years pre/post acquisition 
 N Growth Before Growth After N Growth Before Growth After 
Turnover 34 247% 142% 11 438% 203%
Op. Profit 43 -413% 109% 16 -132% 20%
Assets 58 243% 0% 27 -58% 20%
Cash 49 902% 356% 19 128% 1241%
Employment 127 38% -11% 76 12% -1%
Table 1 – Reported Pre- and Post-Acquisition Growth of Cambridge Companies 
The acquired firms had been experiencing rapid growth of sales, which diminished after 
takeover. Profitability and sales per employee increased but profits were liable to repatriation by 
foreign corporations. A release of assets and job reductions may stimulate entrepreneurial 
activity - with experienced employees leaving to join local start-ups and entrepreneurs founding 
post-acquisition spin-off companies. Spinoffs founded post-acquisition are vulnerable to 
economic volatility but benefit from the previous experience of founders.  
Acquisition was an exit strategy favoured by venture capitalists; we have seen that the incidence 
of acquisition fell when venture capital availability decreased after 2004 (Garnsey and Drofiak 
2009). In the case of biopharmaceutical firms in particular, those receiving VC were more likely 
to be acquired (Mohr and Garnsey, 2009). Acquisition enabled owners to realise value from their 
enterprise and investment. We have seen that for valuations that were disclosed (72 cases), the 
total exceeded £6 billion, but beneficiaries of these deals are difficult to identify. Thus while 9 
spinouts partly owned by the university were acquired, the universities’ share in the proceeds of 
the sale are not reported. 
Limits of employment growth data 
We were aware of the limits of assessing growth on the basis of job numbers, the standard firm 
growth measure (Davidsson and Wiklund, 2000; Sheperd and Wiklund, 2009). One reason why 
these data are commonly used is that they are much more readily available (Davidsson and 
Wiklund, 2000). It is difficult to collect other performance data over time for firms since earlier 
data are seldom archived. We assembled and tracked over time the financial performance of 
those 990 Cambridge firms for which financial performance data was in the public domain. 
These firms overlap with those in the database used for previous figures, but are a smaller total 
with a different distribution by size and sector (see method section). In consequence, we cannot 
generalise to the whole cluster from performance data for this dataset. However by virtue of 
having data in the public domain, they are the most prominent among the Cambridge area tech 
firms. 
The firms in this dataset had by 2008 achieved turnover in excess of £5 billion and profits of 
£341 million, while employing some 30,926 employees locally. These data are summarised in 
figure 15, which shows that the firms as a whole became more profitable by 2005, while other 
performance measures deteriorated after 2006. This finding is congruent with evidence that the 
larger indigenous firms have been growing more profitable in the area. It is also congruent with 
almost half of the best performing firms in the area being acquired under conditions where short 
term profit rather than long term performance appeared to be the priority for acquirers. 
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Figure 15 – Financial Performance Indicators in the Cambridge Cluster 
We have seen that the number of new firms and firms growing from small to mid-sized declined 
after 2000; another sign that the technology crash of the new millennium was followed by a 
marked change in relevant indicators  of business activity in the cluster is seen in patenting 
activity during the period (see figure 16).  
 
Figure 16 – Patenting Activity in the Cambridge Cluster 
4.4. The Cambridge Cluster in Context 
4.4.1. Cambridge and the Attraction of Firms   
As outlined in the introduction, the growth of the Cambridge technology cluster has not been the 
outcome solely of endogenous growth. Over time, the Cambridge cluster has attracted 
technology firms from outside the cluster. These firms have played an important role in 
providing support services, managerial talent, and exposure to external firms seeking to 
collaborate with Cambridge-based technology enterprises.  We assessed the contribution of 
locally founded firms and firms attracted to Cambridge employment in technology firms, 
summarized by date in figure 17. Jobs in attracted firms have grown less fast but been less 
cyclical than in locally founded firms. 
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Figure 17 – Local and Attracted Employment in Cambridge 
4.4.2. The Cambridge Cluster and Silicon Valley 
To set the Cambridge cluster in international context, we investigated available evidence for a 
comparison with Silicon Valley. Although the Cambridge cluster is only around 1/35th the size 
of Silicon Valley in terms of employment, Silicon Valley is often used as a comparator.   The 
Cambridgeshire County had a population of 598,000 in mid 2007 whereas Silicon Valley had a 
population of 2.52 million at the end of 2008. High tech employment in these areas is shown in 
figure 18; no other comparable data are available. 
 
Figure 18 - Total Employment in Silicon Valley and the Cambridge Cluster 
Figure 19 shows the impact of the end of the “technology bubble” during the early 2000s on 
employment in both clusters. The Silicon Valley data shows a decline of approximately 100,000 
jobs from a plateau in 2000-01 before a recovery from 2005. The Cambridge data suggests a 
peak in 2002 and a fall of 3,000 jobs until 2007 when a recovery commenced. Comparative 
resilience in terms of jobs can be seen more clearly if growth is calculated in proportional not 
absolute terms (figure 20), with 1998 firm numbers in each area set at 100. Cost cutting may 
have been more rapid in Silicon Valley. 
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Figure 19 - Employment in Silicon Valley and Cambridge Rebased as 100 in 1998 
The rebased graph in figure 4 shows that the downturn in Silicon Valley was deeper than in 
Greater Cambridge, as employment fell to approximately 91% of its 1998 figure whereas 
Cambridge tech-based firm numbers did not fall below 105% of its 1998 value. The downturn in 
Silicon Valley was especially dramatic for Internet firms, of which there were fewer in 
Cambridge. Sales outside the US were an aid to recovery in the US-centered recession of the 
technology crash, post-millennium. Once a recession extends globally, international markets 
may no longer provide a relative advantage to Cambridge firms. Moreover we pointed to a 
number of causes of concern over the Cambridge cluster, which we take up below. 
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5. Findings 
The guiding propositions are summarised below in Table 4 and discussed in relation to the 
findings. 
Item Proposition Findings 
P1 High growth firms had a disproportionate impact on employment 
growth in the cluster.    
Yes 
P2 The employment contribution to the cluster of net entry-exit of 
firms was greater than that of firm growth. 
No 
P3 Small firms exhibited great growth volatility than large firms  Yes (real and 
category effect)  
P4 High-growth firms were more active acquirers than other firms Yes 
P5 High-growth firms more frequently acquired than other firms. Yes 
P6 Acquisitions resulted in job losses in acquired firms. Yes 
Table 2 – Summary of Findings in Relation to Propositions 
High-growth firms contributed disproportionately to cluster employment during periods of 
upswing but were also important in maintaining growth during periods when the cluster at large 
contracted (proposition 1). In contrast, the net effect of new entries and exits (creative 
destruction), assumed in proposition 2 to be more important than continuing growth,  in fact had 
less of an impact on employment growth in the cluster than did the growth of incumbent firms.  
In the Cambridge tech cluster, firm growth contributed two-thirds of all new job creation 1988-
2008, while entry-exit turbulence accounted for one third of job creation. Larger firms showed 
less volatile growth than smaller ones, as predicted by proposition 3. However the evidence is 
not such as to prove that the growth of successful innovative firms in the area was at the expense 
of less innovative firms. It may be that adverse conditions prevented some innovative small firms 
from reaching mid-size following the technology crash. Nevertheless, the increasing number of 
larger firms that emerged in the cluster reduced vulnerability to business downswings for 
employment in the cluster. The turbulence of the period studies certainly redirected some 
resources, talents and ideas to firms that could use them to advance further growth. The ability of 
firms to overcome growth setbacks and sustain their growth after an interruption was critical for 
the cluster. 
Acquisition is another dimension of turbulence, affecting entry and exit. Propositions 4 and 5 led 
us to expect high-growth firms to be actively involved in takeovers, as acquirers and acquired. 
While evidence on the impact of acquisitions is very limited, it is well known that corporate 
acquirers attempt to introduce more professional management systems and operations (Galpin 
and Herndon, 2007). This should enable the acquired unit to grow more profitable with fewer 
inputs of employees and other assets. Our evidence is consistent with such developments. 
However there may also be an element of destruction in the turbulence of acquisition.  High 
performing firms were particularly likely to be acquired, followed by job losses, asset reduction 
and liability of repatriation of profits by foreign owners. Corporate managers took the place of 
founder entrepreneurs as final decision makers, in contrast with US companies like Microsoft, 
Oracle and Google where founder managers continued to drive strategy. Post acquisition spinoff 
effects require further investigation. A positive effect of such spinoffs is the new entry effect, as 
those selling their firms to acquirers start out new firms, so increasing the pool of firms eligible 
for growth into larger categories.  
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5.2. Reflections on creative destruction  
We have analysed three closely related constituents of growth: entry of firms versus exit of 
firms, organic growth and growth through acquisition, using longitudinal evidence. To this end, 
we departed from cross-sectional studies that dominate most prior work. We used churn analysis 
to gain a better understanding of the impact of creative destruction on the growth of Cambridge 
firms. Transition analysis from one size category to another  revealed proportionately fewer 
small firms growing into larger size categories. Acquisition is another form of turbulence, 
eliminating the independence of acquired firms.  We found that the best performing firms in the 
cluster were more likely to be acquired. 
This paper is centred on new findings and does not attempt a reassessment of the Cambridge 
cluster, examined elsewhere (Garnsey and Heffernan 2005; Drofiak and Garnsey 2009; Evans 
and Garnsey 2009). There is a consensus among cluster studies that positive externalities are 
enjoyed by firms through participation in a cluster (Audretsch and Feldman, 1996; Feldman, 
1999; Feldman, Francis and Bercovitz, 2005). Smaller suppliers benefit from the presence of 
larger local companies through positive externalities. We have shown elsewhere how Domino 
Printing Sciences provided custom for local suppliers (Garnsey, Thomas and Stam, 2009). The 
findings reported here on the ‘big four’ indigenous tech firms show how important such firms are 
for a cluster. The four firms have operated as learning centres where over 6000 employees have 
gained critical experience of rapid and sustained growth in international markets.  
The data presented here are from the eve of the financial crisis, for benchmarking with further 
survey details when these become available. We have seen that average firm size increased and 
that profitability improved among larger firms in the Cambridge tech cluster. This can be 
interpreted as an adaptation to economic conditions, and a reflection of the operation of some 
form of creative destruction. Schumpeter recognised that small firms were highly vulnerable, 
even though a few of them grow in such a way as to displace established rivals (Schumpeter 
1928). In the short term and during a downturn, fewer microfirms imply fewer firms vulnerable 
to recession.  Just as in the plant world, new shoots are ‘switched off” under adverse 
environmental conditions (Harberd, 2006), so a reduction in the proportion of very small and 
vulnerable firms in the cluster may reflect an adaptation to a difficult economic environment. 
The larger firms providing more local jobs in uncertain times may reduce the incentive to 
potential entrepreneurs to start new firms.  In the longer term, there may be compensating effects 
at work if those fewer firms that are started during a recession prove to be unusually robust. We 
have shown elsewhere that there were very high survival rates among the cohort firms founded 
in the recession of the early 1990s; low entry rates can be compensated for when economic 
conditions improve (Drofiak and Garnsey 2009). However a prolonged recession may prevent 
such recovery.  
We have identified a lagged effect whereby a reduction in the pool of smaller firms was followed 
in the next survey period by a reduction in the number of midsized companies. In the past the 
most successful Cambridge tech firms went through a period of being mid-sized. A reduction in 
the mid sized category implies a reduction in the pool eligible to move into larger size 
categories. Through their impact on firms’ moves up size categories, business cycles effects may 
persist over time in the absence of policy input to remedy constraints experienced by young 
knowledge based firms. If these firms are as important for the economy as generally assumed, 




We would like to thank the County Council Research Group for enabling us to be part of the 
team working on the company confidential Cambridge high tech database. This paper builds on 
work by Alex Drofiak and Mark Evans, whose recent contributions illuminated both the limits 
and the potential of the database used here.  
A version of this paper was presented at the Scottish Regional Studies Association 





Acs, Z.J. and Mueller, P., 2008. Employment effects of business dynamics: Mice, gazelles  
and elephants. Small Business Economics, 30(1), 85–100. 
 
Audretsch, D.B. and M.P. Feldman, 1996. R&D Spillovers and the Geography of  
Innovation and Production. American Economic Review, 86, 630-640. 
 
Arthur, W.B., 1989. Competing Technologies, Increasing Returns and Lock-in by Historical  
Events. Economic Journal, 99, 106-131. 
 
Birch, D.L., 1979. The job generation process. MIT program on neighborhood and regional  
change, Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 
 
Birch, David L. (1981). Who Creates Jobs? The Public Interest, 65, 3-14. 
 
Bullock, A., Cosh, A., Fu, X., Hughes, a. and Yang, Q., 2004. SME Growth Trajectories A  
pilot study of UK SME growth and survival using the CBR panel data. Centre for  
Business Research, Cambridge University. 
 
Chaudhuri, S. and Tabrizi, B., 1999. Capturing the real value in high-tech acquisitions.  
Harvard Business Review, 75 (5), 123-130. 
 
Connell, D. and Probert, J., 2010. Exploding the Myths of UK Innovation Policy: How ‘Soft  
Companies’ and R&D Contracts for Customers Drive the Growth of the Hi-Tech 
Economy. Centre for Business Research, Cambridge. 
 
Davidsson, P. and Wiklund, J., 2000. Conceptual and empirical challenges in the study of  
firm growth. In Sexton, D. and Landström, H. (eds.): The Blackwell Handbook of 
Entrepreneurship. Oxford, MA: Blackwell Business.   
 
Davidsson, P. and Wiklund, J., 2006. Conceptual and Empirical Challenges in the Study of  
Firm Growth. In: Davidsson, P., Delmar, F. and Wiklund, J., (eds.): Entrepreneurship 
and the Growth of Firms. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, pp. 39-61. 
 
DeTienne, D.W. 2010, Entrepreneurial exit as a critical component of the  entrepreneurial 
process: Theoretical development, Journal of Business Venturing, 25(2), 203-215. 
 
Diambeidou, M.B., 2008. An Empirical Taxonomy of Early Growth Trajectories. Doctoral  
Dissertation, Université catholique de Louvain, Louvain School of Management: 
Belgium.  
 
Dougherty, D. and Heller, T., 1994. The Illegitimacy of Successful Product Innovation in 
 Established Firms. Organization Science, 5 (2), 200-218. 
 
Drofiak, A. and Garnsey, E., 2009. The Cambridge High Tech Cluster: resilience and  
response to cyclical trends. Institute for Manufacturing Working Paper 2009/01. Institute 





European Union, 2004. Facing The Challenge. The Lisbon strategy for growth and  
employment. Report from the High Level Group chaired by Wim Kok. Available at: 
<http://ec.europa.eu/growthandjobs/pdf/kok_report_en.pdf> 
 
Feldman, M.P., 1999. The New Economics of Innovation, Spillovers and Agglomeration: A  
Review of Empirical Studies. The Economics of Innovation and New Technology, 8, 5-
25. 
 
Feldman, M.P., J. Francis, and J. Bercovitz, 2005. Creating a Cluster While Building a Firm:  
Entrepreneurs and the Formation of Industrial Clusters”. Regional Studies, 39, 129-141. 
 
Frederick, H.H., 2004. Towards high growth enterprise. International Journal of  
Entrepreneurship and Small Business, 1(3/4), 238-248. 
 
Galpin, T.J. and Herndon, M., 2007. The Complete Guide to Mergers and Acquisitions. San  
Francisco: Jossey-Bass.  
 
Garnsey, E., 1998. A theory of the early growth of the firm. Industrial and Corporate  
Change, 7(3), 523-556. 
 
Garnsey, E. and Heffernan, P., 2005. Growth Setbacks in New Firms. Futures, 37, 675-697.  
 
Garnsey, E. and Mohr, V., 2010. When Stars Stumble: Growth Sustainability in Rapid- 
Growth Firms. Unpublished Working Paper. Institute for Manufacturing, Cambridge, 
UK.  
 
Garnsey E., Ferriani S. and Lorenzoni G., 2008. Speciation through entrepreneurial spin-off:  
The Acorn-ARM story. Research Policy, 37, 210- 224. 
 
Garnsey, E., Thomas, B. and Stam, E., 2009. The emergence and development of the  
Cambridge inkjet printing industry. Institute for Manufacturing Working Paper 2009/04. 
Institute for Manufacturing, University of Cambridge, UK. 
 
Gibrat, R., 1931. Les Inégalités Économiques. Paris: Sirey.  
 
Graebner, M.E. and Eisenhardt, K.M., 2004. The Seller’s Side of the Story: Acquisition as  
Courtship and Governance as Syndicate in Entrepreneurial Firms. Administrative Science 
Quarterly, 49(3), 366-403. 
 
Granstrand, O. and Sjölander, S., 1990. The Acquisition of Technology and Small Firms by  
Large Firms. Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organization, 13 (3), 367-386. 
 
Hagedoorn, J. and Duysters, G., 2002. The effect of Mergers and Acquisiton on the  
Technological Performance of Companies in a High-Tech Environment. Technology  
Analysis and Strategic Management, 14(1), 67-85. 
 
Harberd, N., 2006. Seed to Seed: The Secret Life of Plants. London: Bloomsbury.  
 
Henrekson, M. and Johansson, D, 2009 . Gazelles as job creators: a survey and interpretation  
of the evidence. Small Business Economics, forthcoming.  




HM Government Department of Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform (BERR), 2009.  
New Industry, New Jobs.  
 
Hölzl, W., 2009. Is the R&D behaviour of fast-growing SMEs different? Evidence from CIS  
III data for 16 countries. Small Business Economics, 33(1), 59-75. 
 
Hugo, O. and Garnsey, E., 2004. Problem-solving and competence creation in new firms.  
Managerial and Decision Economics, 26(2), 139-148. 
 
Jovanovic, B., 2001. New Technology and The Small Firm. Small Business Economics, 16(1),  
53-56. 
 
Julien, P.-A., 2007. A Theory of Local Entrepreneurship in the Knowledge Economy.  
Cheltemhan, UK: Edward Elgar. 
 
Lim, S. S., Platts, K. and Minshall, T.H.W., 2008. An exploratory study on manufacturing  
strategy formulation in start-up companies. 16th High Technology Small Firms 
Conference. Enschede, The Netherlands, University of Twente. 
 
Mason, C.M. and Harrison, R.T., 2006. After the exit: Acquisitions, entrepreneurial recycling  
and regional economic development. Regional Studies, 40(1), 55-73.  
 
McKelvie, A. and Wiklund, J., 2010. Advancing Firm Growth Research: A Focus on Growth  
Mode Instead of Growth Rate. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 34(2), 261-288.  
 
Mohr, V. and Garnsey, E., 2009. Acquisition as Business Opportunity for Bio-pharm Ventures  
A Resource-Based Evolutionary Perspective. Unpublished Working Paper. Institute  
for Manufacturing, Cambridge, UK.  
 
Moreno, A.M. and Casillas, J.C., 2005. High Growth Enterprises (Gazelles): An Conceptual  
Framework. Available at: 
<http://ecsocman.edu.ru/images/pubs/2005/04/26/0000209801/high_growth.pdf> 
 
Owen, G. (2004) Where are the big gorillas? High technology entrepreneurship in the UK  
and the role of public policy. Discussion paper Interdisciplinary Institute of  
Management, London School of Economics .  
 
Parker, C., van Witteloostuijn, A. and Storey, D.J., forthcoming 2010. What happens to  
gazelles. Small Business Economics.  
 
Penrose, E., 1995. A Theory of the Growth of the Firm (2nd edition).Oxford, UK: Oxford  
University Press. 
 
Ranft, A.L. and Lord, M.D., 2002. Acquiring New Technologies and Capabilities: A  
Grounded Model of Acquisition Implementation. Organization Science, 13(4), 420-441.  
 
 
Reynolds, P.d. and White, S.B., 1997. The Entrepreneurial Process: Economic Growth, Men,  
Women, and Minorities. Westport, CT: Quorum Books. 
28
 
Sarkar, M.B., Echambadi, R., Agarwal, R. and Sen, B., 2006. effect of the innovative  
environment on exit of entrepreneurial firms. Strategic Management Journal, 27(6), 519-
539.  
 
Schumpeter, J.A. 1939. Business Cycles: A Theoretical, Historical, and Statistical Analysis of  
the Capitalist Process. New York and London: McGraw-Hill. 
 
Segal, Quince and Partners, 1985. The Cambridge Phenomenon: The Growth of High  
Technology Industry in a University Town. Cambridge, UK: Segal Quince & Partners.  
 
Sheperd, D. and Wiklund, J., 2009. Are we comparing apples with apples or apples with  
oranges? Appropriateness of knowledge accumulation across growth studies. 
Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 33(1), 105-123. 
 
St.-Jean, E., Julien, P.-A. and Audet, J., 2008. Factors Associated with Growth Changes in  
“Gazelles”. Journal of Enterprising Culture, 16(2), 161-188.  
 
Stam, E., 2005. The Geography of Gazelles in the Netherlands. Tijdschrift voor Economische  
en Sociale Geografie, 96(1), 121–127. 
 
Storey, D.J., 1994. Understanding the small business sector. London: Routledge. 
 
 
